The continuous advances in sensing and positioning technologies have resulted in a dramatic increase in popularity of LocationBased Services (LBS). Nevertheless, the LBS can lead to user privacy breach due to sharing location information with potentially malicious services. A high degree of location privacy preservation for LBS is extremely required. In this paper, a clustering K-anonymity scheme for location privacy preservation (namely CK) is proposed. The CK scheme does not rely on a trusted third party to anonymize the location information of users. In CK scheme, the whole area that all the users reside is divided into clusters recursively in order to get cloaked area. The exact location information of the user is replaced by the cloaked spatial temporal boundary (STB) including K users. The user can adjust the resolution of location information with spatial or temporal constraints to meet his personalized privacy requirement. The experimental results show that CK can provide stringent privacy guarantees, strong robustness and high QoS (Quality of Service).
Introduction
The explosive growth of location-detection devices and wireless communication has resulted in the wide application of Location-Based Services (LBS). The main aim of LBS is to provide services to mobile users based on the knowledge of their locations as well as augmenting many existing services with location information [1] . Examples of LBS are location-based tourist information, live traffic reports, food and drink finder, etc [2] .
The location information of the user is required in LBS, and it is essential in delivering a mobile service, but it may pose a threat on a user's privacy. A person's preference, employ status, or health condition may be inferred based on the location information. Various distressing privacy violations caused by sharing sensitive location information with potentially malicious services have highlighted the importance of location privacy preservation in LBS [2] .
Most of the solutions proposed [3] - [12] to preserve the location privacy are based on Trusted Third Parties (TTP) entity, which is used to blur the exact location information of the user before sending the request to LBS provider. Although this approach is widely accepted, there are some limitations. First, the TTP could become the attack critical point. Once attackers succeed in invading the TTP, it poses great risk on user privacy. The recent reports related to the disclosure of personal data by this kind of trusted entities [2] has proved it. Second, if the TTP is unreliable, the location information may be abused and the users may face undesired advertisements, e-coupons, etc. Thus, the users would prefer to trust nobody, which leads to TTP-free schemes [2] , [13] - [20] . Instead of trusting a third party, users collaborate to protect their privacy.
In this paper, we propose a clustering K-anonymity scheme for location privacy preservation (namely CK) is proposed. CK scheme does not rely on a trusted third party to anonymize the location information of users. In CK scheme, the whole area that all the users reside is divided into clusters recursively in order to get a cloaked spatial temporal boundary (STB). The exact location information of the user is replaced by STB including K users. The user can adjust the resolution of location information with spatial or temporal constraints to meet his personalized privacy requirement.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The related work is summarized in Sect. 2, The system model is described in Sect. 3. The clustering K-anonymity algorithm is presented in Sect. 4. The experiment and result analysis are given in Sect. 5. Finally, we conclude the paper in Sect. 6.
Related Work
Many recent research efforts have been done on preserving a users location privacy while interacting with a LBS provider. These studies can be categorized into two different groups: TTP-based approach and TTP-free approach.
In order to protect the location information of mobile users in the context of LBS, Gruteser and Grunwald [4] firstly employed K-anonymity, which is a TTP-based approach. TTP is used to blur the location information of the user. A subject is considered as K-anonymity with respect to location information, if and only if the location information sent from one mobile user is indistinguishable from the location information of at least K-1 other mobile users. Two representative approaches to location anonymization are Cliquecloak algorithm [14] and the Casper system [5] .
The Cliquecloak algorithm adopts a customizable Kanonymity model instead of a uniform K. Every user can specify a different K-anonymity value based on his minimum anonymity level and his preferred spatial and temporal Copyright c 2012 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers tolerance level in order to maintain the personalized variable privacy requirements. This model can avoid the drawback of a large K-anonymity spatial region, which is an area that encloses the mobile user querying to a LBS server. However, due to the computation overhead of the clique graph, this approach is only able to meet the small K-anonymity requirements of mobile users.
The Casper approach performs the location anonymization using the quadtree-based pyramid data structure, allowing fast cloaking. However, due to the coarse resolution of the pyramid structure and lack of mechanisms to ensure QoS and constrain the size of the cloaking region, the cloaking areas in Casper are much larger than necessary, leading to poor QoS. Other related work includes anonymization of high dimensional relations [15] and extending the concept of K-anonymization via l-diversity [5] , t-closeness [6] and minvariance [9] . We have proposed a TTP-based location privacy protection scheme for pervasive computing in [10] , which can achieve personalized K-anonymity.
TTP-based approaches have some limitations: (1) The system relies on a TTP between the mobile users and the LBS providers. (2) TTP is vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks because TTP easily becomes the bottleneck. (3) Furthermore, if the TTP is unreliable, the location information may be abused and the users privacy is disclosed.
Due to the shortcomings of the TTP-based schemes, other methods that do not rely on TTP have been proposed. In [13] , the first collaborative TTP-free algorithm for location privacy in LBS is proposed. The user aims to select K-1 neighbors to form a centroid including K users, and send to the LBS provider the K perturbed locations including his own. This method does not achieve K-anonymity because the centroid is only used by a single user to identify himself. In addition, due to the noise cancellation, users cannot use this method several times without changing their locations [2] . In [21] , a similar peer-to-peer scheme for location privacy is presented. Its main idea is to generate a cloaking area including K users. When the other K-1 users are selected, the mobile user must exchange his real location with others. If one user among the K-1 users is not trusted, the location privacy may be disclosed. In [14] , a method based on Gaussian noise addition to compute a fake location is proposed. K-anonymity is adopted too, and the LBS provider is unable to distinguish one user from the rest according to the fake area. Based on the work in [14] , the method is extended to support non-centralised communications in [2] . Users have to trust each other because they share their locations. A centroid is computed as the fake location. But one advantage of this methord is that the users real location could be deduced. In [2] , Agusti also proposed a TTP-free scheme, it computes the centroid amongst user and other K-1 companions to achieve K-anonymity. The scheme can achieve robust against the collusion of a modular user and a LBS provider, however, it just get spatial anonymity.
Although the existing schemes play important roles to preserve location privacy, location privacy preservation design is still a challenging area in LBS. The major difference between our work and the aforementioned approaches includes the following aspects:
1. In order to guarantee the QoS in LBS, personalization privacy profile is adopted. Every user can specify his temporal and spatial constraint to meet personalization privacy preservation requirement. 2. To overcome the problems brought by TTP, no TTP entity is used in CK scheme. The user acts as an anonymity server and communicates with LBS providers directly. 3. The selection methods of the cluster center can prevent "center-of-cloaked-area" privacy attack, thus, high privacy preservation can achieve.
System Model
In this section, we describe the architecture of our location privacy protection system in Fig. 1 . Mobile users communicate with LBS providers directly. The user acts as an anonymity server. Cluster algorithms run in the mobile device and the exact location information of a mobile user can be blurred into a cloaked STB by the clustering algorithms.
The STB composed of K users is sent to the LBS provider. Due to lack of the mobile user's exact location information, the LBS provider may send back a list of results to the user. Lastly, the user will select the most optimal result based on his exact location information. The value of K can vary with the anonymity level of each mobile user, and the personalized K-anonymity is achieved. The following six steps in Fig. 1 describe the whole process.
1. Request Composer module of every mobile user sends a message consisting of his temporal tolerances, K, and a LBS request.
Location Provider module provides Privacy Protection
Engine (PPE) with the exact location information of the user. 3. PPE performs cluster algorithms. The exact location information is replaced by a cloaked area of the cluster where the mobile user locates. is sent to the appropriate LBS providers by the user 6. LBS providers return a list of results to the user during the temporal tolerance. The mobile user will select the optimal result.
Privacy Threat Model
We consider a model in which users query LBS server directly. We assume that the LBS users are trusted. However, we do not any assumption about the trustworthiness of the location-based service providers.
User Privacy Personalization Profile
Each user can specify her privacy requirements in a privacy personalization profile. The profile can support temporal, spatial, the required anonymity level and the required cloaked area size. When a mobile user requests LBS, the PPE will generate a user profile. A user profile is a message defined as follows: m si ∈ S : {u id , n id , (x, y), K, C t }. The payload content in m si is omitted. In order to achieve the K-anonymity, the PPE module must find other K-1 users. Thus the cluster algorithm is run to divide the whole area into several clusters. The exact location information in m si is replaced by STB of the users cluster so as to achieve K-anonymity. Consequently the user sends a message m ti to LBS. Let ∅(t, s) = [t − s, t + s], which extends a numerical value t to a range by amount s. m ti is defined as follows.
K-1 Companions
In order to achieve the K-anonymity, every user must find K-1 companions for hiding their location from LBS providers. Depending on the number of users into their cover range, we can face the situations as follows [2] :
• There are no users: In this case the users cannot proceed with the next steps of the method because they cannot find the required amount of companions.
• There are less than K users: In this case the user must extend the cover range repeatedly until the required number of users K is found. If the procedure ends without the required number of companions, the whole process is stopped.
• There are K users or more: In this case the K anonymity level is reached because the needed K companies are easily found. In this case in which there are more than K users, say K , the procedure continues with a number of companions between K and K .
In our scheme, the clustering algorithm is used to set up and adjust the STB which can guarantee include K users.
Clustering K-Anonymity Algorithm
The CK algorithm runs on the mobile device of the user to blur his exact information. The notions used in CK algorithm are listed in Table 1 .
The whole process of CK algorithm is depicted in Fig. 2 . The process is divided into four stages: initialization, cluster construct, cluster adjustment and cluster cloaking finish.
In initialization phase, CK algorithm selects the initial cluster center. The choice of initial center has strong relations with the complexity of clusters construction. In this paper, we adopt the same methods as those in [10] . i.e., 
Content of message c i
The i-th cluster P need
The probability of rebuilding a cluster when a mobile user moves.
N ex
The number of extra nodes without which the cluster can still keep robust. Fig. 2 The process of clustering algorithm. 
After initialization, CK algorithm begins to construct clusters and adjust clusters such as the division and mergence of clusters.
Constructing Cluster
The user who requests LBS services constructs a cluster including K users. To achieve the K anonymity, after selecting the cluster center, each point is assigned to the nearest cluster according to the distance from it to the center. Then the new center will be calculated and each point is assigned to the nearest cluster again. The above process will repeat until the sum distance between every point and cluster center (CDS) converges to a certain range.
The process of constructing clusters is illustrated in Algorithm 1. The initialization phase is in lines 2-4. C m is defined as a structure which records the cluster identifier, the nodes identifier, the cluster center, the cluster size, CDS, STB, P need , N ex , and a variable divided. The local variable divided represents if the cluster needs division, depending on the value of P need and N ex . When P need is equal to zero and N ex is more than one, divided is true.
C m changes as a new cluster is created or an old cluster is merged. Initially, C m only contains the initial cluster c 0 , if an old cluster c j can be divided into two new clusters c a and c b , then c j is deleted and c a and c b are inserted into C m . When a user leaves the old cluster and joins another one, both centers will be adjusted. Figure 3 illustrates the process of constructing cluster. In Fig. 3 , the circle represents a user, and the number of the circles indicates the K-anonymity level. First, the initial center of the cluster is selected. The distances from other nodes to the center are computed as shown in (a) and (b). Then, every node is assigned to its nearest cluster and the cluster center is re-computed as shown in (c) and (d) until the center does not change. The procedure is repeated and the cluster C 1 is divided into two clusters as shown in (e) and (f) until any cluster cannot be divided any longer.
Cluster Adjustment
A mobile user is roaming from one domain to another domain, so clusters may be adjusted when some users join or leave a cluster. Firstly, a cluster does not need adjusting if a user roams in his original cluster. Secondly, a user will be assigned to the nearest cluster if he leaves his home cluster. If his home cluster cannot meet the K-anonymity level, it should be merged with its nearest cluster.
A User's Joining
We denote k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k m as anonymity levels of m users, where k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k m are arranged in the ascending order. When one or multi-users join a new cluster, it should divide the cluster into two clusters. But if either cluster cannot meet the requirement of K-anonymity, cluster adjustment is not successful. Only P need and N ex are re-calculated and users can obtain higher privacy levels because the cluster size is larger than k m . The process is shown in the Algorithm 2 (Joining part).
A User' s Leaving
When a user leaves the home cluster, four scenarios may occur.
Firstly, if m is bigger than k m , the cluster can still keep robust. When one user leaves, it holds that m − 1 ≥ k m , which means the anonymity levels of the rest users can still be met. Therefore, P need and N ex are re-calculated and the cluster does not need rebuilding.
Secondly, if the equations of m = k m and k m > k m−1 are true, a user whose anonymity level is k m leaves the cluster. The cluster size will become m − 1, and k 1 ≤ k 2 ≤ . . . ≤ k m−1 ≤ m − 1 is true. The anonymity levels of the rest users can still be met. Therefore the cluster does not need rebuilding.
Thirdly, if the equation of m = k m is true, a user whose anonymity level is k i leaves (k i k m ). Therefore, the cluster size will become m − 1 and k m is bigger than m − 1. At this time, K-anonymity cannot be met because of a users leaving, the cluster should be merged with a neighbor that owns the minimum STB. Algorithm 6 is called.
It can be drawn from the second and third scenarios that The process is shown in the Algorithm 2 (Leaving part). It searches the neighbor cluster of c i with the minimum STB. Users in c i will be added into the neighbor cluster c j , and then c i is deleted from C m . At last, it merges c j into bigger ones.
Proof of Clustering K-Anonymity Algorithm
In our algorithms, K-Anonymity is considered to be successful if the number of users in a cluster is no less than k m . Then, we will prove the correctness of our algorithms, which shows that the temporal requirement, spatial requirement and K-anonymity are met. user p join 1 %Find cluster c i which is the nearest cluster and can reach after p joins
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Experimental Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the performance of CK algorithm in terms of four important performance measures through simulated experiments. (1) Entropy. Entropy is as a measure of uncertainty of a system. Greater entropy means more uncertainty and indicates high privacy preservation. (2) Cloaked area size. This measure gives the average size of the cloaked areas generated by our algorithm. (3) Anonymization success rate. This is a ratio of the number of times that the clustering algorithm can successfully construct the cluster to satisfy the users k-anonymity privacy requirements. (4) QoS. This measure gives the relative temporal and spatial resolution. We use the VANET (Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network) [11] system that simulates movement of cars and generates requests using the position information. Random Map Generator has been performed to create the geographical distribution of the map and the trace of the vehicles respectively. The number of mobile users is selected from the list {100, 200, 400, 600, 800, 1000}. The beginning time and temporal tolerance of each user randomly assigned. The K-anonymity level is 2 and 5 as the typical. For every combination of the different number of K, 10 data sets recording users' location information are used. Accordingly the sum of sets is 6 × 2 × 10.
Entroy Analysis
Entropy is as a measure of our uncertainty about a system. Higher entropy means more uncertainty and indicates higher privacy level.
CK algorithm aims to protect location privacy with personalized K-anonymity. K-anonymity represents that the attacked probability of each user is 1/K in a region of K users. For any cluster, C is defined as the number of users in the cluster and k m is defined as the maximum Kanonymity level. In CK algorithm, each cluster is built based on C ≥ k m which indicates that any person can get more privacy than he expects.
Let p i denote the probability that the i-th user may be regarded as a target user T by attackers. The entropy of all users is defined as H(p) = −Σp i log 2 p i . Since it can be ob-
and we can hold that H(p) = log 2 C ≥ log 2 k m . In Fig. 4 , it show that the entropy of MN method is more higher, which indicates that CK algorithm adopting MN center choice method can provide more uncertainty, and can reduce the probability of being identified by center-of-cloaked-area privacy attack.
Anonymization Success Rate
In Fig. 5 , the relationship between the number of clusters and the number of users is depicted. The number of clusters is linear with the number of users. Though the number of clusters in these methods is different, the slope of each method is constant, which indicates the size of the cluster is nearly a constant. Hence we can draw the conclusion that the size of clusters does not change with the increment of the number of users, which shows that CK algorithm can build clusters stably.
QoS Analysis
Relative Temporal Resolution
The relative temporal resolution is a measure of the temporal resolution provided by the cloaking algorithm, normalized by the minimum acceptable temporal resolution [9] . We define the relative temporal resolution as R t = 2Σd t C (C.t e −C.t s ) . The bigger R t shows that K-anonymity can be achieved within a short time as shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 . Because mobile users always move, the clusters need being adjusted to meet the K anonymity. Figure 6 shows the relationship between the time consumption of adjusting clusters and the percentage of joining users, 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20% respectively. The maximum consumption time is no more than 0.15 s. Figure 7 shows the relationship between the time consumption of adjusting clusters and the percentage of leaving users, 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20% respectively. The maximum is less than 0.06 s. Figure 6 and Fig. 7 show that our algorithm can adjust the dynamic cluster to meet the users temporal requirement, because the time consumpiton is in the range tolerated by users. Figure 8 shows the relationship between R t and K. MN can provide the smallest R t . R t is constant in the three methods of NR, PR and RS. R t ≥ 1 can be guaranteed in the four methods, which shows that our algorithm can provide higher anonymity level than the users expect. Figure 9 illustrates the relationship between the cluster size and the total number of users. It indicates that the cluster size is almost stable. MN is higher than the other methods, but still less than 2k m . Therefore, the cluster size can be regarded as a constant. When a user joins, the cluster size is C +1. Once a member leaves, the cluster size is C -1. If two clusters merge, the maximum size is 2 C -1 at most.
Relative Spatial Resolution
The relative spatial resolution is a measure of the spatial resolution provided by the cloaking algorithm, normalized by the minimum acceptable spatial resolution. We define the relative spatial resolution as R s = S c /S , and S c is defined as the area of a cluster C. S is defined as the total area of all clusters. The relation between R s and the cluster size is approximately linear. If a smaller region is sent to the LBS, a smaller list of results will be returned. Figure 10 shows R s is much lower than one in all the methods. Though the STB area is small, K-anonymity can still be guaranteed. Therefore, CK algorithm can provide more high QoS.
Complexity Analysis
We compare the complexity of our algorithm with ARNN [9] , Nbr-k and local-k [9] , HilbertCloak [4] and 
Algorithm
Complexity
O(n lg n) HilbertCloak [4] O(n lg n)
Casper [5] . For a cluster containing n users, the complexity of one clustering procedure in CK method is O(nt), which can be simplified to O(n), since the number of iterations t is constant. In the worst case, the complexity of the recursion process is T (n) = 2T (n/2) + O(n). Since O(n) is the complexity of each procedure, there must exist a constant satisfying T (n) ≤ 2T (n/2) + an. Thus, the total complexity can be O(n lg n). Table 2 shows the complexity comparisons. It can see that the complexity of CK is O(n lg n), which is lower than that of Nbr-k, Local-k and ARNN.
Conclusions
A clustering K-anonymity scheme (CK) for location privacy preservation has been proposed in this paper. CK can effectively protect location privacy without TTP entity. The User acts as an anonymity server between mobile users and LBS providers, the exact location information of a mobile user can be blurred into a cloaked spatial area by the clustering algorithms. Users can define personalized K-anonymity and temporal tolerance as needed. The primary contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
1. In order to guarantee the QoS in LBS, personalization privacy profile is adopted, users can specify temporal and spatial constraints to meet personalization privacy preservation requirements. 2. The choice method for the cluster center can prevent center-of-cloaked-area privacy attack, thus, high privacy preservation is achieve. The experimental analysis proves that our approach can provide stringent pri-vacy guarantees, strong robustness and high QoS. 
